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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code, section 78-2-
2(3)(c), and Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are two issues on appeal: whether the District Court erred in failing to 
impose the sanction of disbarment against the Respondent, Peter M. Ennenga, for his 
misappropriation of money from a client and other professional misconduct, and 
whether the District Court gave undue weight to factors in mitigation of Ennenga's 
misconduct. These issues were preserved in the District Court through closing 
argument and through the Sanctions Hearing Brief submitted to the court. [R. 411 at 
106-124; 326-341] 
Both of these issues are questions of law. On appeal, the Court may draw its 
own inferences from the District Court's factual determinations, which are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. See In re Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, fl 20. While the 
Court gives serious consideration to the District Court's rulings and factual findings, it 
"'may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline' if the 
evidence warrants." See id. (quoting In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1990)). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 6. Aggravation and Mitigation. 
6.1. Generally. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to 
impose. 
6.2. Aggravating circumstances. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Aggravating 
circumstances may include: 
(a) prior record of discipline; 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(e) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally railing to 
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct 
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
(h) vulnerability of victim; 
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
(k) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
6.3. Mitigating circumstances. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify 
a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances 
may include: 
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) personal or emotional problems; 
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; 
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to 
the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
(f) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(g) good character or reputation; 
(h) physical disability; 
(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; 
and 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental 
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation; and 
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
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(j) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the 
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that 
the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay; 
(k) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or 
impairment; 
(I) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(m) remorse; and 
(n) remoteness of prior offenses. 
6.4. Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating. 
The following circumstances should not be considered as either 
aggravating or mitigating: 
(a) forced or compelled restitution; 
(b) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
(d) complainants recommendation as to sanction; and 
(e) failure of injured client to complain. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case, the Course of Proceedings, and Its Disposition in 
the District Court 
This is an attorney discipline matter. The District Court suspended the 
Respondent, Peter M. Ennenga, under circumstances in which he should have been 
disbarred. The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") appeals the 
District Court's decision, and respectfully urges this Court to reverse it, and instead to 
enter an order of disbarment against Ennenga. 
The OPC filed a Complaint against Ennenga in August 1997 and a First 
Amended Complaint in September 1997. [R. 1-68; 145-165; 75-144] The District Court 
granted partial summary judgment as to some counts of the OPC's complaint. [R. 268] 
On January 11, 2000, the District Court presided over a trial to determine 
whether Ennenga violated the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"). [R. 309-314] 
By means of a Memorandum Decision entered January 18, 2000, the court issued 
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findings of fact on the basis of which it concluded that Ennenga violated the Rules. [R. 
309-314] 
Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a sanctions hearing on March 28, 2000. 
[R. 364] After the sanctions hearing, the court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and entered an order sanctioning Ennenga by suspending him from the practice 
of law for a period of six months. [R. 376-385; R. 389-392] 
B. Statement of the Facts 
1. Proceedings Before the OPC Filed Its Complaint in District Court 
The OPC received informal complaints from several of Ennenga's clients, and 
these are the bases for the disciplinary action against him. [R. 2-3; 146-148] In each 
matter, the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar conducted Screening 
Panel hearings, and voted to issue a formal complaint against Ennenga. [R. 2-3; 146-
148] Specifically, Rodney Glover filed an informal complaint against Ennenga on 
February 8, 1993, and the Screening Panel hearing was on October 19, 1993; Alice 
Durrant-Funk filed one on April 2, 1993, and the Screening Panel heard it on October 
19, 1993; Taner Yarbil filed one on April 13, 1995, and it was presented for a Screening 
Panel hearing on February 1, 1996; and JoAnn Wilson filed one on May 30, 1996, and 
the matter reached a Screening Panel hearing on January 30, 1997. [R. 2-3; 146-148] 
The OPC initiated this attorney discipline action by filing a complaint against 
Ennenga in District Court on August 6, 1997. [R. 1-68] The initial complaint included 
allegations and counts arising from the Glover, Yarbil, and Wilson matters, but not the 
Durrant-Funk matter. [R. 1-68] With Ennenga's consent, the OPC filed a First 
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Amended Complaint on September 12, 1997, which included allegations and counts 
arising from the Durrant-Funk matter. [R. 73-74; R. 145-165; 75-144]1 
In August 1998, the OPC moved for Partial Summary Judgment as to some of 
the counts of its First Amended Complaint [R. 172-174; 175-186] The District Court 
granted summary judgment as to two counts that involved Ennenga's failure to respond 
to the OPC's requests for information on four separate occasions in the Yarbii matter 
and in the Durrant-Funk matter, in violation of Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules. [R. 268-
269;159-160; 162] 
2. The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Establish That Ennenga Committed Serious Professional Misconduct 
Ennenga collected $18,000 on behalf of a client, JoAnn Wilson, who asked him 
to hold the money in an interest-bearing trust account. [R. 309] Instead of putting the 
money in trust, Ennenga deposited a portion into his checking account and retained the 
balance in the form of a cashier's check. [R. 309-310] Ultimately, Ennenga spent all of 
Wilson's money for personal purposes. [R. 310] Although Wilson's accountant 
requested an accounting and Wilson tried to contact Ennenga about the money, these 
efforts were fruitless despite promises from Ennenga that he would pay Wilson the 
money. [R. 310] Ennenga paid Wilson only after she had filed a complaint against him 
with the OPC. [R. 310] Ennenga used his position as Wilson's attorney and fiduciary to 
1
 The index of the District Court record shows the Consent to Amend Complaint as 
page numbers 73-144. This is inaccurate, inasmuch as the consent is merely two 
pages long. Page numbers 75 through 144 are the exhibits, albeit out of their proper 
alphabetical sequence, which were attached to the First Amended Complaint, 
numbered pages 145 to 153 and 155 to 165. Pages 153 and 154 are a Notice of 
Informal Complaint that the OPC believes should have been part of Exhibit "B" attached 
to the First Amended Complaint; instead, they have been inserted in the middle of that 
document. 
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obtain possession of her money. [R. 310] Ennenga breached his fiduciary duty and 
converted Wilson's funds for his own use without her permission or knowledge. [R. 310] 
Taner Yarbil retained Ennenga in June 1993 to represent him in a civil action. [R. 
310] Although Ennenga filed a Complaint and served one of the two defendants, he 
discontinued work on the case and did not inform Yarbil that he would no longer pursue 
the matter. [R. 311] 
The OPC requested information from Ennenga about the Wilson, Yarbil, and 
Glover complaints, but Ennenga failed to timely respond to any of these requests. [R. 
312]2 
On the basis of the foregoing findings, the District Court concluded that Ennenga 
violated the following Rules: Rule 1.4 (Communication), 1.15 (Safekeeping Property), 
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct-
Committing a Criminal Act That Reflects Adversely on the Lawyer's Honesty), and Rule 
8.4(c) (Misconduct—Engaging in Conduct Involving Dishonesty). [R. 312] The Court 
also found that "the statute of limitations bars the OPC's complaint against Ennenga on 
the Glover matter."3 [R. 313] 
3. The Sanctions Hearing 
The case proceeded to a sanctions hearing on March 28, 2000. [R. 376] The 
District Court concluded that disbarment is the appropriate presumptive sanction for 
Ennenga's misconduct. [R. 379] Having identified the appropriate presumptive 
2
 The OPC had previously won summary judgment as to Ennenga's failure to 
cooperate with regard to its investigation of the Durrant-Funk matter, as well as the 
Yarbil matter. [R. 268-269; 159; 162] 
3
 The OPC does not appeal this ruling. 
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sanction, the court analyzed the circumstances that may be considered and weighed in 
deciding what ultimate sanction to impose. [R. 379-380] 
The court made the following findings as to aggravating factors. Ennenga had 
prior discipline, but its nature differed from his misconduct in the Wilson matter.4 [R. 
380] Ennenga acted to benefit himself and his family. [R. 380] There was no pattern of 
misconduct "excepting [Ennenga's] reluctance to participate in the disciplinary process 
against him." [R. 380] There were multiple offenses, but from the court's perspective, 
there was one serious offense and several minor offenses. [R. 380] Ennenga 
obstructed the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with rules or 
orders of the disciplinary authority. [R. 380] "Mr. Ennenga has admitted the wrongful 
nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and expresses 
sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took place. He, 
however, did not openly admit any of these things until shortly before the trial." [R. 380-
381] Neither of the victims was particularly vulnerable, and "Ms. Wilson, in fact, made 
the misconduct too easy." [R. 381] Ennenga practiced law for twenty-one years before 
the date of the misappropriation. [R. 381] Ennenga made full restitution, "but did not do 
so until he was under duress." [R. 381] "The only illegal conduct that occurred here 
was the misappropriation of funds." [R. 381] 
The District Court also made the following findings as to mitigating factors. 
Ennenga suffered "personal and emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet 
his regular financial obligations." [R. 381] Ennenga made full restitution to Wilson, 
4
 The OPC observes that although the previous misconduct did not involve 
misappropriation of client funds, Ennenga testified that "in one of the cases I might have 
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although it was "not particularly timely." [R. 381] Witnesses testified that Ennenga "was 
a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty." [R. 382] "There was a 
significant delay in this matter" that is "attributable as much or more to the OPC as it is 
to Mr. Ennenga;" but Ennenga "has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from the 
delay." [R. 382] The court found that there was interim reform, evidenced by the fact 
that Ennenga has had no valid complaints filed against him for misconduct after 1992. 
[R. 383] Ennenga "is very remorseful and has been since the 1992 misconduct." [R. 
383] 
The court found and concluded that "[t]he mitigating circumstances outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances." [R. 383] It further concluded that, "Weighing the 
misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince 
shows a significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number 
of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and 
sanction." [R. 383] 
Based upon the foregoing findings and the conclusions it drew therefrom, the 
District Court entered an order suspending Ennenga from the practice of law for a 
period of six months, followed by a three-year period of supervision by "an experienced 
attorney." [R. 389] The court also required Ennenga to "participate in psychological or 
psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again." [R. 390] 
4. The Delay In the Proceedings 
Nearly four years elapsed between Ennenga's misappropriation of Wilson's 
money and Wilson's filing an informal complaint with the OPC. [R. 410 at 4; 2-3; 146-
misled the clients into thinking that I was going to do something that I wasn't at that 
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148] Wilson testified that she asked Ennenga to put into an escrow account the 
$18,000 he collected on her behalf. [R. 410 at 4-5] Although she was unsuccessful in 
getting Ennenga to give the money to her, she assumed this had to do with reasons 
other than the truth of the matter: that Ennenga had misappropriated it. [R. 410 at 5-9] 
Wilson did not learn what became of the $18,000 until her informal complaint had been 
heard by the Screening Panel. [R. 410 at 9-11] Indeed, in response to a question 
about whether she asked Ennenga where the funds were, she testified, "No, I didn't 
ever question where the funds were[.] I had told him to put them in an escrow account." 
[R. 410 at 19] Thus, Wilson did not realize that Ennenga had misappropriated her 
money until after she had complained to the OPC. 
The District Court's findings establish that Ennenga obfuscated the status of the 
money: Wilson's accountant requested an accounting, Wilson tried to contact him about 
it, Ennenga promised he would pay her. [R. 310] Ennenga's testimony on this point 
included the following: "I never told JoAnn Wilson's [sic] Wilson that I had used her 
money. At the same time, I never told JoAnn Wilson that she would never get her 
money, that her money somehow had vanished. I basically used the language to keep 
her in suspense about what was happening with her money." [R. 411 at 89] He added 
that he responded to Wilson's requests "[o]nly when cornered . . . ." [R. 411 at 90] 
Ennenga also agreed that "it's fair to say" that the things he told Wilson kept her on 
hold. [R.411 at 101] 
Wilson filed her complaint on May 30, 1996. [R. 2-3; 146-148] The case 
proceeded to a Screening Panel hearing on January 30, 1997. [R. 2-3] The Complaint 
point in time prepared to do." [R. 411 at 17] 
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was filed approximately six months later, during which time the OPC met with Ennenga 
and there were discussions with his counsel. [R. 411 at 103-105] 
Although there was no further on-the-record activity in the court case until August 
1998, the OPC made a couple of overtures to settle the case predicated upon the newly 
announced decisions of this Court in the Babilis and I nee matters. [R. 411 at 105; 135-
136] As counsel explained to the District Court, the OPC hoped that these decisions 
would assist it in resolving the Ennenga matter without the necessity of taking it to trial. 
[R.411 at 135-136] 
Settlement efforts failed, however, and the OPC filed its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, and served discovery requests on Ennenga in the form of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. [R. 187-188] When the time 
for answering those requests expired without a response, the OPC requested 
Ennenga's cooperation, and warned it would seek an order compelling him to respond. 
[R. 219; 225] Thereafter, the OPC agreed to extend the time for response pending the 
District Court's ruling on the OPC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [R. 219; 
226] Approximately one month later, the OPC asked Ennenga to proceed. [R. 219; 
226] When Ennenga again failed to answer the requests, the OPC telephoned his 
counsel, who again requested an enlargement of time. [R. 219] The OPC acquiesced, 
but cautioned it would seek an order compelling responses if they were not forthcoming. 
[R. 219-220] Still, Ennenga failed to respond to the discovery requests, and in January 
1999, the OPC was forced to ask the District Court for assistance, which it granted in an 
Order Compelling Discovery entered February 26, 1999. [R. 218-230; 240-241] 
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Ennenga did not serve answers to the OPC's discovery requests until March 23, 1999.5 
[R. 245] 
In addition to impeding the progress of discovery, Ennenga made no effort to 
hasten the pace of the litigation. His testimony acknowledged that neither he nor his 
attorney initiated any effort to move the case forward. [R. 411 at 8] Ennenga was not 
aware of any efforts by his counsel to expedite the case, and he never requested an 
expedited hearing. [R. 411 at 8] 
5. Ennenga Concealed His Misconduct From His Colleagues, Clients, 
and His Ecclesiastical Leader and Told His Wife About It Only When 
Paying Restitution Became an Issue 
Thomas Lowe, was Ennenga's partner during the time Ennenga misappropriated 
Wilson's money. [R. 411 at 36-38] Lowe testified that by taking Wilson's money and 
placing it in his own account instead of the firm trust account, Ennenga violated firm 
policy. [R. 411 at 37-38] Lowe agreed that in doing so, Ennenga deceived him and the 
other partners of the firm. [R. 411 at 38] Moreover, Ennenga concealed his actions 
from Lowe for a number of years: Lowe first learned of the Wilson situation when the 
firm received a letter from her attorney. [R. 411 at 38-39] 
Ennenga's long-time friend and client, Kent Chard, testified that he had only 
known for a few days before trial of Ennenga's misconduct. [R. 411 at 55, 60] 
Ennenga's ecclesiastical leader, Scott Williams, testified that Ennenga was 
remorseful, but Williams had only known about the Wilson matter for one week prior to 
the sanctions hearing. [R. 411 at 65-66] 
5
 Additionally, although the District Court ordered Ennenga to pay the OPC's 
attorney's fees in connection with his failure to answer its discovery requests, Ennenga 
did not pay the fees until nearly one year later. [R. 411 at 11-12] 
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Ennenga's wife, Nancy Ennenga, testified that she first learned of the Wilson 
matter three years before trial (approximately four years after the misappropriation), "in 
connection with paying the money back." [R. 411 at 81-82] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court's decision to suspend Ennenga, rather than disbar him, is 
contrary to established law: Ennenga should have been disbarred for his 
misappropriation of a client's money. Moreover, the court's conclusions concerning 
certain mitigating factors contravene the clear language of the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Discipline ("Standards") and the guidance given by this Court in recent attorney 
discipline decisions. Because of their significant role in the analysis of the District 
Court's error in imposing the sanction of suspension in lieu of the appropriate 
presumptive sanction of disbarment, the OPC will first address the court's errors in 
identifying and weighing mitigating factors. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Its Analysis of the Mitigating Factors 
The District Court identified as mitigating circumstances several factors that 
either do not meet the criteria set forth in the Standards or are inconsistent with this 
Court's guidance as to how they should be weighed. Although it is difficult to know how 
much weight the court placed on each of the factors it identified, its conclusion was that 
M[t]he mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances." [R. 383] The 
court added that "[w]eighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against the misconduct of 
Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a significant difference in the seriousness of the 
conduct, both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time 
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elapsed between misconduct and sanction." [R. 383] Thus, although there were 
numerous significant aggravating factors,6 including dishonest or selfish motive, 
obstruction of the disciplinary process, substantial experience in the practice of law, 
failure to make restitution until under duress, and illegal conduct in the form of 
misappropriation, the District Court nevertheless concluded that the mitigating factors 
were so substantial as to warrant departure from the presumptive sanction of 
disbarment. This was error. 
A. The District Court Erred in Concluding That Ennenga's Personal 
Problems Resulting From Financial Problems Constitute a Mitigating 
Circumstance 
The District Court found that Ennenga misappropriated Wilson's money because 
of a history of poor business practices that resulted in financial problems so severe he 
could not make mortgage payments in a timely fashion. [R. 378] Ennenga used the 
money he misappropriated from Wilson to prevent foreclosure on his house. [R. 377-
378] The District Court concluded that "Mr. Ennenga was suffering personal and 
emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet his regular financial obligations." 
[R. 381] The court's statement that "[w]eighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against 
the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a significant difference in the 
seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the 
attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and sanction^" suggests it 
6
 The District Court found that Ennenga has a prior record of discipline, which is 
identified as an aggravating factor, "but not of the same nature as the Wilson 
misconduct." [R. 380] Under its analysis of the mitigating circumstances, which include 
"[a]bsence of a prior record of discipline," the court found that "there is a prior record of 
discipline, but less significant tha[n] 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct." [R. 
381] The court thus appears to have noted Ennenga's prior record of discipline as an 
aggravating circumstance, but assigned it little weight. 
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accorded this factor substantial weight in deciding to diverge from the presumptive 
sanction of disbarment. [R. 383 (emphasis added)] 
The Standards indeed identify as a mitigating circumstance "[p]ersonal or 
emotional problems." Rule 6.3(c), Standards. An attorney's financial problems are 
entitled to little weight, however, as a mitigating circumstance. See In re Ince, 957 P.2d 
1233, 1237-1238 (Utah 1998) (Ince's numerous health and financial problems did not 
mitigate theft of firm and client money); see also Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Krasnoff, 
488 So.2d 1002, 1006-1007 (La. 1986) (attorney's personal adversity does not greatly 
mitigate disciplinary violations). The New Jersey Supreme Court put it thus: 
It makes no difference whether the money is used for a good purpose or a 
bad purpose, for the benefit of the lawyer or for the benefit of others, or 
whether the lawyer intended to return the money when he took it, or 
whether in fact he ultimately did reimburse the client; nor does it matter 
that the pressures on the lawyer to take the money were great or minimal. 
The essence of [In re Wilson] is that the relative moral quality of the act, 
measured by these many circumstances that surround both it and the 
attorney's state of mind, is irrelevant: it is the mere act of taking your 
clients money knowing that you have no authority to do so that requires 
disbmarment 
The misuse of clients' money as a matter of convenience to defray 
personal expenses such as for a vacation and a party, does not 
ameliorate the ethical misconduct. Family financial pressures cannot 
excuse an attorney's ethical dereliction. 
In re Blumenstyk, 704 A.2d 1,12 (N.J. 1997) (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
The root cause of Ennenga's personal problems was his failure to live within his 
means, and his willingness to finance his mortgage to the detriment of his client. The 
District Court's conclusion on this point is a signal to lawyers that their financial 
problems are sufficient justification to overcome severe sanction for their misconduct, 
and it is error because it is contrary to the direction given by this Court in Ince. 
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B. The District Court Erred in Concluding That Ennenga's Compelled 
Restitution Is a Mitigating Circumstance 
The Standards identify as a mitigating circumstance "timely, good faith effort to 
make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved." Rule 
6.3(d), Standards. The District Court found that Ennenga "only repaid [Wilson] in 1997 
after her informal complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she had also retained an 
attorney to take action against Mr. Ennenga for the money." [R. 378] Ennenga 
eventually paid Wilson the principal, plus interest and attorney's fees. [R. 378-379] The 
court additionally found that "Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly timely, but he did 
completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson." [R. 381] 
The District Court did not mention this factor when it compared Ennenga's 
misconduct with that of the attorneys in previous discipline cases, so perhaps this was 
not a significant component of its decision to suspend rather than disbar Ennenga. 
Because the point is ambiguous, however, the OPC is compelled to address it. 
The Standards require both that the restitution be made and that it be timely if it 
is to constitute mitigation. Here, restitution was made, but it was not timely, and there is 
unambiguous precedent from this Court to the effect that restitution made after an 
attorney's misconduct has been detected does not qualify as a mitigating factor. In 
Ince, the Court explained why: 
After an attorney's misconduct is discovered, restitution can be 
characterized simply as the 'honesty of compulsion' and may be evidence 
only of the lawyer's ability to raise the money or desire to avoid being 
disbarred rather than of a sincere desire to rectify the wrongdoing. 
In re Ince, 957 P.2d at 1238; see also Rule 6.4(a), Standards ("Forced or compelled 
restitution" is a circumstance that "should not be considered as either aggravating or 
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mitigating."); Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Gridley, 545 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Nebr. 1996) 
("The fact that no client suffered any financial loss is no excuse for a lawyer to 
misappropriate clients' funds nor any reason why a lawyer should not receive a severe 
sanction."). 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed it as follows: "The restitution of 
misappropriated funds does not alter or obscure the fact that when restitution is used to 
support the contention that the lawyer intended to 'borrow' rather than steal, it simply 
cloaks the mistaken premise that the unauthorized use of clients' funds is excusable 
when accompanied by an intent to return them. The act is no less a crime. Lawyers 
who 'borrow' may, it is true, be less culpable than those who had no intent to repay, but 
the difference is negligible in this connection." In re Blumenstyk, 704 A.2d 1, 10-11 
(N.J. 1997) 
Because Ennenga did not attempt to ameliorate his wrongdoing until long after 
he was caught and confronted, and indeed only after Wilson reported it to the OPC and 
hired counsel to take action against him, restitution is entitled to no weight in mitigation 
of his misconduct. 
C. The District Court Erred in Concluding That Delay in the Disciplinary 
Proceedings Constituted a Mitigating Circumstance 
The Standards identify as a mitigating circumstance "unreasonable delay in 
disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did not substantially contribute to 
the delay and provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting 
from the delay." Standards, Rule 6.3(j). The District Court found as follows: 
There was a significant delay in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file 
her complaint against respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect 
to other matters referred to above were filed in 1993. The OPC has been 
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conducting an investigation into this matter since 1993, and only filed its 
Complaint in August of 1997, and its First Amended Complaint in 
September of 1997.7 Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't facilitate moving the 
case forward on a faster track in his refusal to provide information to the 
Bar through the discovery process, but the delay is attributable as much or 
more to the OPC as it is to Mr. Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not 
demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay. 
[R. 382] 
As a threshold matter, the OPC observes that the District Court did not find that 
the delay was unreasonable. [R. 382] Nevertheless, the court appears to have given 
this factor considerable weight as a mitigating circumstance, for it subsequently 
concluded that "[w]eighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against the misconduct of 
Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a significant difference in the seriousness of the 
conduct, both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and time 
elapsed between misconduct and sanction.19 [R. 383] 
The court's findings suggest it weighed the factors causing the delay and 
concluded that Ennenga contributed to it less than the OPC. This is not the equivalent 
of finding that Ennenga "did not substantially contribute to the delay." Moreover, 
Ennenga's failure to disclose to Wilson the status of her money delayed her discovery of 
his misappropriation, and was surely a factor contributing to the four-year interval 
between the misappropriation of Wilson's filing of her informal complaint. Counting the 
delay in Ennenga's favor would reward his long-term concealment of his misconduct. 
7
 The most serious complaints against Ennenga were the Wilson matter and 
Ennenga's repeated failure to cooperate with the OPC. The OPC filed its Complaint in 
District Court within approximately six months of the Screening Panel hearing on the 
Wilson matter, and the entire disciplinary case proceeded to trial in less than three 
years. 
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Even more significantly, however, the District Court explicitly found there was no 
evidence of prejudice to Ennenga. Indeed, Ennenga's testimony acknowledged that the 
delay worked to his benefit, insofar as it permitted him to continue practicing law. [R. 
411 at 9] Additionally, he testified that, "The longer I didn't hear about this case the 
better off I was. The more functional I was. I wasn't interested in being real proactive 
with this." [R.411 at 96] 
This Court considered whether a four-year delay in the disciplinary proceedings 
should be treated as a mitigating factor in the Babilis case. Although the District Court 
found that Babilis had been "'prejudiced to some degree by the delay in both ability to 
recollect and the effect adverse publicity has had on him personally and on his 
practice,'" the Court concluded the delay was not prejudicial. Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 217 
(Utah 1997). The Court observed: 
There are no facts indicating that Babilis opposed the delay or even 
complained about it. Indeed, at least some of the delay was apparently for 
his benefit so that he could resolve other pressing concerns. The 
disciplinary court concluded that the cloud of disrepute engendered by bad 
publicity on '[Respondent and his practice [was] not insubstantial.' 
Nevertheless, Babilis was the person responsible for this, and it is difficult 
to comprehend how the delay harmed his reputation; rather, it enabled 
him to push back the day of judgment 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The delay in the proceedings permitted Ennenga to postpone accountability, and 
as the District Court found, Ennenga failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the 
delay. Under these circumstances, the court's conclusion that the delay is a mitigating 
circumstance constitutes error. 
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D. The District Court Erred in Concluding That the Absence of 
Complaints Against Ennenga Since the Time He Misappropriated 
Wilson's Money Constitutes Interim Reform 
The Standards identify as a mitigating circumstance "interim reform . . . ." Rule 
6.3(k), Standards. The District Court found that "Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid 
complaints filed against him regarding misconduct after 1992[]" apparently in support of 
its conclusion that there was interim reform. [R. 383] 
The OPC does not dispute the absence of further complaints against Ennenga, 
but believes the District Court erred in concluding this constitutes interim reform in the 
context of a misappropriation case. Interim reform might be meaningful as mitigation in 
cases that do not involve an attorney's basic integrity and honesty.8 It has little value, 
however, in mitigation of misconduct arising from theft of client funds and other acts 
going to the attorney's fundamental lack of integrity. 
E. The District Court Erred in Concluding That Ennenga's Eleventh-
Hour Expressions of Remorse Constitute Remorse Within the 
Meaning of the Standards 
The Standards identify "remorse" as a mitigating circumstance. See Standards, 
Rule 6.3(m). The District Court found that "Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful and has 
been since the 1992 misconduct." [R. 383] Elsewhere, the court found that "Mr. 
Ennenga has admitted the wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his 
involvement completely, and expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since 
the misconduct took place. He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until 
shortly before trial." [R. 380-381] Additionally, although Ennenga testified that he is 
remorseful, he also stated, "I made a mistake, and now I keep having it thrown at me 
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time after time. I think it [sic] about it often enough without it being thrown at me." [R. 
411 at 96-97] 
In the Ince case, this Court stated that Ince's "interim remorse and reform is not 
compelling." Ince, 957 P.2d at 1238. The Court noted that although Ince's law firm 
confronted him with evidence of misconduct, he "was not forthcoming." ki. at 1238. 
Additionally, Ince admitted the misconduct "only when confronted with specific evidence 
and was never completely willing to admit to undiscovered misconduct." ]d. The Court 
concluded that, "[r]ather than seeming truly sorry for his conduct and admitting to it, Ince 
seemed sorry only that he had been caught." ]d. 
This Court also had occasion to consider remorse as a mitigating factor in the 
Tanner decision, which stated, "Tanner's remorse at trial is irrelevant. Naturally, anyone 
going through a trial for [stealing client money and forging documents] would feel 
remorse after getting caught. Instead, the remorse question closely relates to 
acknowledgement of wrongful conduct: did Tanner feel remorse about his behavior 
before getting caught, and was he motivated by remorse in making amends? . . . The 
district court's ruling that Tanner failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
conduct makes clear that Tanner was unmotivated by remorse until after discovery." 
Tanner, 960 P.2d 399, 403 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). 
As these cases make clear, remorse is shown through honest and uncompelled 
disclosure of the misconduct before it is discovered by others and an attempt to rectify 
its consequences without being forced to do so. Ennenga's expressions of remorse at 
trial simply do not qualify. Ennenga had many opportunities to tell Wilson the true 
8
 For example, an attorney's interim reform might mitigate misconduct in the form 
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status of her money, and yet he chose not to. Instead, he repeatedly assured her she 
would receive it, then reneged on his promises. As the District Court found, "he stalled 
her when she started requesting the funds by avoiding discussion of the funds' 
whereabouts or the specific time that he would remit them to her. Mr. Ennenga testified 
that he didn't want to lie to Ms. Wilson, but he didn't want to admit that he had taken the 
funds and no longer had them either. . . . [H]e only repaid her in 1997 after her informal 
complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she had also retained an attorney to take 
action against Mr. Ennenga for the money." [R. 378] Thus, Ennenga never told her he 
had stolen her money and used it for his own purposes, and didn't "come clean" until 
after Wilson retained counsel to assist her in collecting it. Admitting his misconduct and 
re-paying Wilson were not the acts of a remorseful person; they were the acts of 
someone with no viable alternatives. 
Likewise, Ennenga failed to disclose his conduct to those in whom a genuinely 
remorseful person would confide: his partner, his wife, his ecclesiastical leader. 
Ennenga told his wife what he had done in connection with paying restitution. [R. 411 at 
81-82] His former partner learned of it when the firm received a letter from Wilson's 
counsel. [R. 411 at 38-39] His ecclesiastical leader learned of the misconduct only on 
the eve of the sanctions hearing. [R. 411 at 65-66] 
II. The District Court Appears to Have Assigned Too Little Weight to the 
Aggravating Factors 
A. Ennenga's Selfish Motive Is a Substantial Aggravating Circumstance 
The District Court found that Ennenga had a selfish motive: "Mr. Ennenga's act 
was to benefit himself and his family." [R. 380] Elsewhere, the court found that 
of failure to diligently communicate with a client or prosecute cases. 
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Ennenga misappropriated the money because his "history of poor business practices" 
resulted in financial problems such that "he could not make his mortgage payments 
when due." [R. 378] The court nevertheless concluded that the mitigating 
circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances and there was a "significant 
difference in the seriousness of the conduct [as compared with that of Tanner, Stubbs, 
Babilis, and Ince], both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the 
time elapsed between misconduct and sanction." [R. 383 (emphasis added)]. 
With the exception of Stubbs, each of the respondents referred to by the court 
was selfishly motivated to misappropriate money. Indeed, Ince was motivated to pay for 
a house he could not afford. The District Court's conclusion that Ennenga's selfish 
motive is entitled to little weight was error. 
B. The District Court Erred in According Little or No Weight to 
Ennenga's Pattern of Misconduct, the Fact That He Committed 
Multiple Offenses, and Obstructed the Disciplinary Proceedings 
The Standards recognize "a pattern of misconduct" as an aggravating 
circumstance. See Rule 6.2(c), Standards. The District Court "does not find a pattern of 
misconduct in this matter, excepting [Ennenga's] reluctance to participate in the 
disciplinary process.11 [R. 380 (emphasis added)]. The court thus appears to have 
minimized "pattern of misconduct" as an aggravating circumstance, and there is no 
mention of it when the court weighed the factors. 
The Standards also recognize "[m]ultiple offenses" as an aggravating 
circumstance. See Rule 6.2(d), Standards. With respect to this factor, the court found 
that "[w]hile consideration of the rules violated would seem to indicate multiple offenses, 
it is the trial court's perspective that there were minor offenses and one stand-alone 
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serious offense, namely the Wilson matter" [R. 380] The minor offenses to which the 
court refers include Ennenga's repeated failure to cooperate with the OPC's 
investigations of the complaints against him. [R. 312] 
Finally, the Standards identify "[obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary authority." See 
Rule 6.2(e), Standards. The District Court found that "Ennenga admits this." [R. 380] 
Without discussing this factor, the court concluded that mitigating circumstances 
outweighed the aggravating circumstances, and thus must not have accorded it 
substantial weight. [R. 383] 
The court's trivialization of Ennenga's repeated failure to cooperate with the 
disciplinary proceedings is baffling, in light of its findings that (a) he violated Rule 8.1(b) 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct; (b) "in three separate instances he failed to 
provide information to the OPC through the normal discovery process in this case;" (c) 
he "interfered with the pending disciplinary action against him;" and (d) he admitted that 
he obstructed the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with the 
rules or orders of the disciplinary authority." [R. 376-377, 379-380] 
Ennenga's repeated failure to cooperate with the disciplinary proceedings is a 
serious violation in and of itself. In this case, because the misappropriation of client 
money warranted disbarment as the presumptive sanction, Ennenga's multiple 
instances of failure to cooperate, which took many forms, and constituted the 
obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings, should have weighed heavily in the balance 
and vigorously argues against a downward departure from the presumptive sanction. 
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C. Ennenga's Failure to Openly Admit the Wrongful Nature of the 
Misconduct Constitutes an Aggravating Circumstance 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating circumstance "refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to the client or to 
the disciplinary authority." See Rule 6.2(g), Standards. The court found that Ennenga 
"admitted the wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement 
completely, and expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the 
misconduct took place. He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until 
shortly before trial" The District Court erred in failing to give this factor the weight it was 
due: Ennenga's failure to openly admit his wrongdoing is, in essence, a refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct. 
D. The District Court Erred in Finding That Wilson "Made the 
Misconduct Too Easy" 
The Standards identify as an aggravating factor "vulnerability of victim." See 
Rule 6.2(h), Standards. The District Court found that "neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. Wilson 
were particularly vulnerable." [R. 381] The OPC disagrees with this finding with respect 
to Yarbil because he lives outside of this country, but does not appeal it. The error lies 
in the court's next statement: "Ms. Wilson, in fact, made the misconduct too easy." [R. 
381] 
Wilson was Ennenga's client, and by virtue of their attorney-client relationship 
was entitled to place in him the utmost trust and confidence. Wilson didn't ask Ennenga 
where the money was because she believed she already knew: held in trust on her 
behalf. [R. 410 at 19] Ennenga's misappropriation of Wilson's money cannot be 
excused or explained by blaming her gullibility or complacence. The court's seemingly 
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off-handed blame-the-victim comment is inappropriate, and to the extent that the 
sentiment it expresses may have influenced the court's decision to impose a sanction 
other than disbarment, was error. 
E. Ennenga Had Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor "substantial experience in the 
practice of law." See Rule 6.2(i), Standards. The court found that Ennenga was in 
practice "21 years to the date of the misappropriation of funds." [R. 381] The court did 
not address the weight of its finding with respect to Ennenga's misappropriation of 
Wilson's money, nor did it apply the aggravating circumstances to Ennenga's knowing 
failure to cooperate with the OPC's investigation of his misconduct. 
Although an attorney's length of time in practice has little to do with matters of 
fundamental integrity and honesty,9 it has substantial implications for matters 
concerning an attorney's knowledge of the law. For example, an attorney's lack of 
experience might in some circumstances mitigate misconduct in the form of 
incompetence with respect to an area of practice. Ennenga's twenty-one years in 
practice substantially aggravates his failure to cooperate with the OPC's investigation. 
He was, or should have been, well aware of his obligations and responsibilities in that 
connection, and by virtue of his longstanding membership in the Bar, understands the 
gravity of the reasons behind the rule requiring his cooperation. The District Court's 
conclusion that this aggravating factor applied only to Ennenga's misappropriation of 
Wilson's money was error. 
9
 See e^ . In re Blumenstyk, 704 A.2d 1, 12 (N.J. 1997) ("a satisfactory or 
distinguished career does not lessen the enormity of the knowing misappropriation of a 
client's funds," and "seems less important to us where misappropriation is involved."). 
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F. Ennenga's Restitution Was Neither Timely Nor Made in Good Faith 
The Standards identify as an aggravating circumstance "lack of good faith effort 
to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved." See Rule 
6.20), Standards. The District Court found that "Mr. Ennenga has made full restitution, 
but did not do so until he was under duress." [R. 381] Although it appears the court 
concluded this was an aggravating circumstance, its weight was undercut by the court's 
finding as a mitigating circumstance that "Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly 
timely, but he did completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson!' [R. 381 
(emphasis added)]. The court thus found that Ennenga's restitution was not timely, and 
it was made only under duress. This is not a good faith effort within the meaning of the 
Standards, and is contrary to Rule 6.4's directive that forced restitution is neither an 
aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance. See Rule 6.4, Standards. 
G. Misappropriation of Funds Is a Significant Instance of Illegal 
Conduct, and Entitled to Substantial Weight 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor "illegal conduct, including the 
use of controlled substances." See Rule 6.2(k), Standards. The District Court found that 
"[t]he only illegal conduct that occurred here was the misappropriation of funds." [R. 
381] Thus, the court made the correct finding (i.e. that misappropriation is illegal), but 
perhaps revealed its attitude towards the factor's significance when it used the word 
"only" in describing misappropriation as a species of illegal conduct. 
Even a single instance of illegal conduct, particularly something as serious as 
misappropriation,10 is entitled to substantial weight in the balancing process in which a 
Misappropriation constitutes illegal conduct under several sections of the 
criminal code. See acj. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; Utah Code Ann. § 76-404.5. 
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court must engage when determining whether a departure from the presumptive 
sanction is warranted. The District Court's minimization of the significance of this factor 
was error. 
III. The District Court's Decision to Suspend Ennenga Was Error 
The case law interpreting the Standards is clear: absent truly extraordinary 
mitigating circumstances, an attorney's theft of client money warrants disbarment. The 
District Court's decision to suspend rather than disbar Ennenga is error and contrary to 
established law in light of Ennenga's misappropriation of client funds and multiple 
instances of failure to cooperate with the OPC's investigations, coupled with the 
presence of several substantial aggravating circumstances and only minimal mitigation. 
A. Even a Single Instance of Misappropriation Can Warrant Disbarment 
In attempting to distinguish Ennenga's case from that of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis, 
and Ince, the District Court stated merely that Ennenga's misconduct "shows a 
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of 
incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and 
sanction." [R. 383] The court thus suggests that one of the significant differences 
between Ennenga and the attorneys who have been disbarred in recent years is the 
number of incidents involved. Coupled with the court's statement that from its 
perspective, the other offenses were minor and there was a single serious offense, it 
appears the court considered Ennenga's single act of misappropriation insufficient to 
warrant disbarment. This is error. 
Of particular significance in an attorney/client context is the statute governing 
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513(2). 
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The OPC acknowledges that repeated instances of misconduct are more 
egregious than single instances, and observes that the Standards take account of this 
by identifying "a pattern of misconduct" and "multiple offenses" as aggravating 
circumstances. Rule 6.2(c), (d), Standards. Thus, if a respondent violated the Rules, 
the presumptive sanction might be increased if the misconduct is aggravated by the fact 
that there is more than one instance and if the instance is of the same nature. The rules 
do not, however, include a provision identifying "isolated incident" as a mitigating factor, 
and this is as it should be, especially in matters involving an attorney's fundamental 
integrity. The fact that an attorney stole money, but only stole money on one occasion, 
neither diminishes the nature nor lessens the severity of the misconduct. The OPC 
urges the Court to reject this as a factor that substantially distinguishes Ennenga's case 
from recently reported attorney discipline cases. 
Attorney discipline decisions from other jurisdictions are helpful in evaluating the 
merit of recognizing "isolated incident" as a factor that can legitimately lessen the 
severity of the sanction imposed. For example, in a case in which the respondent 
attorney converted client funds to his own use, the Supreme Court of Oregon disbarred 
him notwithstanding the fact that the conversion was accomplished through a single act 
of misconduct. See In re Pierson, 571 P.2d 907 (Or. 1977). The court noted its history 
of disbarring lawyers who convert their clients' money, and acknowledged that cases 
prior to Pierson involved more than one instance, whereas Pierson's conversion 
involved a single instance. See id. at 909. The court nevertheless disbarred Pierson, 
and stated as follows: 
It is true that in each of those cases the lawyer was accused and found 
guilty of more than one charge of misappropriation of funds, while the 
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accused in the instant case is found guilty of only one conversion. We 
have no reason to believe, however, that any member of the Bar of this 
state has been led by those decisions to consider or presume that a single 
instance of misappropriation of a client's funds will be tolerated. If a 
member entertains such a conception, let his mind be hereby disabused 
thereof. We hold that a single conversion by a lawyer to his own use of 
his client's funds will result in permanent disbarment 
]d. (emphasis added); see also In re Starks, 520 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. 1999) (single instance 
of misappropriation, along with other types of misconduct, warranted disbarment); Foote 
v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 517 So.2d 561 (Miss. 1987) (single instance of 
misappropriation, along with other types of misconduct, warranted disbarment). 
B. The Standards and the Case Law Interpreting Their Application Make 
It Absolutely Plain That Disbarment Is the Appropriate Ultimate 
Sanction for Ennenga's Misconduct 
As the Court has noted, "[t]o justify a departure from the presumptive level of 
discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors must be 
significant." In re Ince, 957 P.2d at 1238. Moreover, when the weight of the mitigating 
factors is at least balanced by the aggravating factors, no adjustment to the presumptive 
discipline is warranted. See id. 
In In re Babilis, the Court considered an attorney's conversion of client funds to 
his own use and adopted as a general rule the principle that "intentional 
misappropriation of client funds will result in disbarment unless the lawyer can 
demonstrate truly compelling mitigating circumstances." In re Babilis, 951 P.2d at 217. 
The case law developed since then in the Ince, Tanner, and Stubbs cases reinforces 
the principle articulated in Babilis: fundamentally dishonest acts ordinarily will be 
sanctioned with disbarment. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997); In re Ince, 
957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998); In re Stubbs, 974 P.2d 296 (Utah 1999); In re Tanner, 960 
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P.2d 399 (Utah 1998). Ennenga's case is not sufficiently different, nor are the mitigating 
circumstances sufficiently compelling, to warrant a different outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Disciplinary proceedings inquire into an attorney's fitness to practice, not merely 
into whether the alleged misconduct occurred. Consequently, matters not arising from 
the misconduct are relevant in aggravation or mitigation of the presumptive sanction. 
Ideally, the District Court engages in a balanced consideration, guided by established 
law, of the relevant factors, giving each its appropriate weight. In the instant case, 
however, the District Court gave undue weight to factors that, in reality, were not 
particularly compelling and indeed were contrary to established law. 
Viewed in context, Ennenga's restitution was coerced, his remorse evident only 
after his misconduct was discovered, and he benefited from any delay in the 
proceedings. Given this, the District Court erred in concluding that the evidence of 
mitigation justified reducing the severity of the presumptive sanction. 
The Standards and the recent case law interpreting those Standards are clear: 
attorneys who steal money should be disbarred absent truly compelling mitigating 
circumstances. Under the circumstances of this case, which involved Ennenga's 
misappropriation of client money and little compelling mitigation, the District Court's 
decision to suspend Ennenga instead of sanctioning his misconduct with disbarment, 
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was error. The OPC therefore respectfully requests the Court to reverse the order of 
suspension, and to disbar Ennenga. 
DATED: October ,Q3 ,2000. 
Kate A. Toomey ' 
Deputy Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
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ADDENDUM 
Memorandum Decision of January 18, 2000 
Memorandum Decision of April 3, 2000 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Order: Suspension 
i A N j ; 2QM 
:/CGUMTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT 
In the Matter of the Discipline 
of: 
PETER M. ENNEN6A, #0999 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970905496 
At the conclusion of trial on January 11, 2000, the Court took 
this matter under advisement and now issues its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in 
the state of Utah since 1970. 
2. In approximately the spring of 1991 JoAnn Wilson retained 
the respondent to collect various amounts owed her, including a sum 
in the approximate amount of $18,000 owed to her business by Thomas 
E. Soderberg. 
3. Respondent collected $18,000 from Thomas E. Soderberg on 
or about May 21, 1992. 
4. On approximately May 26, 1992, Wilson requested that 
Ennenga hold the $18,000 in an interest-bearing escrow account. 
5. Respondent never deposited said money in any trust or 
escrow account, but in October of 1992 deposited a portion of 
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Wilsonfs money into h Is personal checking account, retaining the 
balance in the form of a cashier's check-
6 . Respondei 1 t spen t: a] 3 • i: f Wi ] s» :: nf s money for personal 
purposes. 
7 Xi i April, ±.z>z>jt Wilsonf s accountant r equ est eel a n 
account i i lg o I: the money from, respondent, and respondent failed to 
provide it. 
Wilson made several attempt - . 
regain q her money and respondent eiv.h- r faileo t espond <. i 
promised payment, which he failed to do. 
,:i" , Wilson filed an inf orma "1 romp I a i nt aga I nst r espc.)ndenl 
wi th L M^\7 ^n 1996. 
10 Respondent did not pay Wilson her money until June of 
1997. 
11 Respondent used his position as Wilson's attorney and 
fiduciary to obtain possessior of Wilson's money. 
1 2 Respondent - • •* •• : r ar*y duty and converted 
Wilson" i;, funds for *, - ithout ner permission or knowledge. 
13. Taner Yarbil retained fespondent on 3 une 3, 19 93 on a 
contingency fee has i s 111 r aprf'senf hi i in i n a c:i v :i 1 actj oi i. 
14, Respondent requested a retainer of $2,250 of which Yarbil 
paid respondent $750. 
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15. Respondent filed a Complaint on Yarbil1s behalf and 
served one of two defendants in said case, but stopped any actions 
to prosecute said case and failed to inform Yarbil that he was no 
longer going to pursue the matter. 
16. Yarbil filed an informal Complaint with the OPC on April 
15 1995. 
17. Beginning in the late 1970's respondent represented 
Rodney Glover in various matters, including part of a divorce 
proceeding. 
18. Respondent's representation of Glover enabled him to 
learn certain details regarding Glover's financial condition. 
19. On January 29, 1987 respondent obtained from Glover 
$7,500 in the form of a loan. 
20. Glover received only a form Promissory Note signed by 
Ennenga, there was no security for the Note, and Ennenga did not 
provide Glover any information regarding Ennenga's ability to repay 
the Note. 
21. Ennenga did not advise GJLover to consult with independent 
counsel regarding the transaction, and Glover did not consent in 
writing to the loan arrangement with Ennenga. 
22. Ennenga failed to timely repay the loan. 
T>\\ 
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2 3 Glover filed suit against Ennenga seeking payment, and 
obtained a Default Judgment against him on March 7, 1989, which 
Ennenga did not pay. 
24 - Glover retained the services r Raymond Farrell 
to attempj - -:•>*/ 
25. The attorney who represented ,ovei :n +-^<* lawsuit in 
which the Judgment was obtained c Mar r> explained to 
Gl over t: .hat : Ei n i --• -'t- - • ri;j.-- } > •* -: - - • - •" 
Conduct• 
Glover filed an informal Complaint with the OPC on 
" *
! 
The OPC sent Ennenga requests for information in response 
• . Wilson's Complaint, Yarbil's Complaint and Glover's Complaint. 
'" . i t,i' t. ime.lv i"T.':-spend t w , ; n equests tot: information 
from the OPC. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Th :i s Cu»u r f: has a I rcad^ entered Summary Judgment aqa i nst 
the defendant on Counts 8 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint and 
concludes that respondent violated Rule R.L(b) of the Rules of 
Profess:! ona ] Condi ic t, am: :i< :i :ii i: i said Summary Judgment t.he Colli: t finds 
that respondent violated Rules 1.15, 8.4(b)(c), 1.4 and 8.1 with 
respect to the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
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2. The Court finds that the statute of limitations bars the 
OPC Complaint against Ennenga on the Glover matter. 
Counsel are to contact the Court and arrange a sanctions 
hearing pursuant to Rule 11(f) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability. 
Dated this (o day of January, 2000. 
x9^^fr<7 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD' 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mail ed a true and correct ,."opy >i the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this day of 
J a i ii ia:c y 2 0 00: 
Kate A. Toomey 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professiona 1 Conduct 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent 
5790 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
w 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAl/DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of: 
: CASE NO. 970905496 
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999 
: 
Respondent. 
: 
This matter was tried on January 11, 2000, after which the 
Court took the matter under advisement. Prior to trial, Summary 
Judgment had been entered against respondent on Counts 8 and 13 of 
the First Amended Complaint, concluding that respondent had 
violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On 
January 18, 2000, the Court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, concluding that the respondent violated Rule 
1.15, Safekeeping Property; 8.4(b), Committing a Criminal Act that 
Reflects Adversely on the Lawyerfs Honesty; 8.4(c), Engaging in 
Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation; 
1.4, Failing to Communicate with Client; and 8.1, additional 
conclusions of respondent's Failure to Provide Information to the 
Office of Professional Conduct. Following the Findings and 
Conclusions and after a waiver with respect to the time for a 
sanctions hearing, a hearing was held on March 28, 2000 regarding 
the issue of sanctions. The Court took the matter under advisement 
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and now Issues this Memorandum Decision with respect to said 
sancti 01 is 
Pursuant to Rule \ nl' thc-t Standards for Imposing1 Lawy ci 
Sanctions, generally the following factors should be considered: 
a. ; 
1 awyer fs mental state; 
"i" The? potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
miscondniM itui 
"T'IK'* existence of aggravating or mitigating factors* 
The specific duties violated by Mr. Ennenga with respect t: 
8 1! wer e :i i i thr ee separ ate i nstances h = f'ai 1 ed ^ 
information to the OPC through the normal discovery process i. tr.:-
case, The duty that he violated with respect -:: ~<u;e 5 * t c i n 
f a i J i 111j 1 o ( ".imintJr111,tcif ii• w i I-11 \ 1 K M 1 1 11,JJ i n e \ \ 
partial retainer of $7 50 and filing a Complaint, Mr Ennenga *-.Led 
continue to work on the matter and failed to inform Mr Yarb: 
!: hri t |" a,cl Mi t:l i respt-
Ennenga collected the sum of $18,000 for his client, Ms. Wilson, i-. 
May of 1992. Ms. Wilson requested that Mr Ennenga hold it i*- Mis 
i ii terest-bearing tr us t ctr< .omit bt»i iause she w as goi it KJ through 
several important changes in her life and felt that the money would 
be better kept by her attorney. Mr. Ennenga never deposited the 
money into ?» *-r^«+- account, but instead deposited part i i I his 
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personal checking account and had part converted into a cashierfs 
check, all of which he took and used for himself. At least part of 
the money was used to prevent Mr. Ennenga1s family home from being 
foreclosed for failure to make mortgage payments. 
The reason that Mr. Ennenga misappropriated Ms. Wilsonfs money 
was that he had a history of poor business practices in connection 
with his law practice which resulted in his personal financial 
situation being such that he could not make his mortgage payments 
when due. This objective financial situation was coupled with Mr. 
Ennengafs subjective inability to inform his wife and children that 
he was not meeting his financial obligations. Mr. Ennenga knew 
that Ms. Wilson was not going to require immediate payment of her 
funds to her, and he stalled her when she started requesting the 
funds by avoiding discussion of the fund's whereabouts or the 
specific time that he would remit them to her. Mr. Ennenga 
testified that he didnft want to lie to Ms. Wilson, but he didn't 
want to admit that he had taken the funds and no longer had them 
either. He further testified that he had many thousands of dollars 
outstanding in the form of accounts receivable and from the time 
that he took the $18,000 he believed he would be able to replace it 
with interest and pay Ms. Wilson her funds when she required them. 
Of course, this was not the case and he only repaid her in 1997 
after her informal complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she 
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had also retained an attorney to take action against Mr. Ennenga 
for the money. 
M i Var In 1 .1 i I in " ' pr,t i f y ' »i rlenri> w.i r",i pr esented 1:o 
show that he suffered an injury result of Mr. Ennengafs 
misconduct. M , Ennenga paid Ms. Wilson the sum of $30,000 in 1997 
i 11 II i r i i i! t e i e s 1 1 1 ) d i t t, < > r m • y • • i t H e • , 1111 I w 1ii • • i n 
she testified, she did not claim any further injury. 
Rule 4 : the Standards ; Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states 
. ',•.-' c:i ire " -r 
application factors set forth above from Rule thi 
sanctions are generally appropriate as follows: when a lawyer 
itiiujiageif. m in p i o f e s s i O J M II m i M 'HIIHJIII t >i s. d e f :i i led :i i: I Rii ::i ] € )\ , i (»n | (<J ! 
(e) or i\)t disbarment : the presumptive sanction, Mr Ennenga1s 
misappropriation v: Wilson^ funds clearly falls ml* Rule 
M '1(a), He tii.:Led ,. .- inten! I benefit him.1.;el 1 ., Send 
also falls within Rule 4 2(b), because the misappropriation of 
funds was serious criminal conduct and involved misrepresentation 
I ' l M . I Will I '" I Ml II HI 1 IIII I III 1 -SdlJJifJ I U|J I J ri t(l I I I II II I I I I I I 1 I ( i l l " I ' l l K ) t h i i : ! l 
violations fall either under Rule 4.3 nr '1,4 • Mr. Ennenga 
knowingly engaged in the misconduct and caused potential Injury to 
the lega] system,, and ii iterfered M I tl :i the pendi i lg d isc i p 1 Inary 
action against him. 
' -i 
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Unbeknownst to the OPC, Mr. Ennenga had received two prior 
reprimands which he acknowledged at trial. Said reprimands were 
for failure to do timely filings in the late 1980fs that did not 
involve money. 
The presumptive sanction under Rule 4.2 for respondents 
misappropriation of Ms. Wilsonfs money is disbarment. 
The next step in the analysis of the appropriate sanction is 
consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set 
forth in Rule 6. In In re: Babilis, 951 P.2d 215, the Supreme 
Court explained that, "To justify departure from the presumptive 
level of discipline set forth in the standards the aggravating and 
mitigating factors must be significant." 
Rule 6.2 provides that aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a) Prior record of discipline. There was prior discipline, 
but not of the same nature as the Wilson misconduct. 
(b) Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennenga1s act was to 
benefit himself and his family. 
(c) A pattern of misconduct. The Court does not find a 
pattern of misconduct in this matter, excepting his reluctance to 
participate in the disciplinary process against him. 
(d) Multiple offenses. While consideration of the rules 
violated would seem to indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial 
•an 
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court's perspective that there were minor offenses and one stand 
alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter. 
(e) Obstruction of the disciplinar\ oroceedinc bv 
intentional] y failing * iiply11 
disciplinary authority *. Ennenga admits this. 
(f) Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process. Thi s has 
apparently not occurred. 
( j) Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 
misconduct avolved, either to the client or to the disciplinary 
authority. H. , Ennenga has admitted the wrongful nature of the 
ii :i s c o r • • lb :ii s i nvolvement complete! y, and expresses 
sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took 
place. He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until 
w h o r l " I ") '" 1 »et"Of e t.lir-> t r I it I 
(h) Vulnerability victim Neither Mr. Yarb *s. 
Wilson were particularly vulnerable Mr Wilson, in fact, made the 
nt i. !i(i:i;iiin1linri t i n i fuisy 
(i) Substantial experience I n the practice of law. Mr. 
Ennenga has practiced law ;.c • some 30 years, but r was only 21 
years t I l,i- ij.il i uf f) - -.. o. -.riatjcui .;»!; J **3 . 
(U Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to 
rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga 
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has made full restitution, but did not do so until he was under 
duress. 
(k) Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled 
substances. The only illegal conduct that occurred here was the 
misappropriation of funds. 
The mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6.3 are as 
follows: 
(a) Absence of a prior record of discipline. As stated 
above, there is a prior record of discipline, but less significant 
than 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct. 
(b) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Not the case 
here. 
(c) Personal or emotional problems. Mr. Ennenga was 
suffering personal and emotional problems as a result of his 
inability to meet his regular financial obligations. 
(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to 
rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga1s 
effort was not particularly timely, but he did completely rectify 
the consequences to Ms. Wilson. 
(e) Full and free disclosure to the client or the 
disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct, or 
cooperative attitude toward proceedings. This did not occur. 
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(f) Inexperience in the practice «** ^ e ]?.w Not applicable. 
(g) Good character or reputation *. attorneys in good 
standing and t:w c c] i ents :)f I I:i : Enn< J ' Jil they 
believed despite the facts of the i nstant case, that Mr. Ennenga 
was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty. 
(h) Phy si call d i sabi 2 ii ty Nc • !:: appl ii cab] e. 
(iI Mental disability or impairment. Not applicable. 
(j) Unreasonable delay i n the disciplinary proceedings 
the delay and provided further that the respondent has demonstrated 
prejudice resulting from the delay. There was a significant delay 
W h i 1 e M'.i -• t I i 11» IM-.'I C < unipJI a i nit, 
against the respondent until 1996 c* ner complaints with respect to 
other matters referred to above were filed in 1993. The OPC has 
been cuiiihit "1 i mj ,in i nvfs1, • 'i'*1 i on :i i l tc tlii s ma ai id 
only filed its Complaint August of 199 7, and its First Amended 
Complaint In September Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't 
facilitate mov inrj tine v .* un a taster t raci^ ill liii;. iielusaill 
to provide information to the Bar through the discovery process, 
but the delay is attributable as much or more to the OPC as i t is 
to Mr. Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated prejudi< :c 
resulting from the delay. 
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(k) Interim reform. Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid 
complaints filed against him regarding misconduct after 1992. 
(1) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is 
aware of no other penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered. 
(m) Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful 
and has been since the 1992 misconduct. 
(n) Remoteness of prior offenses. Prior offenses are not 
particularly significant, but are also not particularly remote in 
time. 
The mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances. In considering appropriate sanctions, the Court ha 
reviewed the Tanner, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 960 P.2d 399 (1998, 
Utah Lexis 40); Stubbs, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 974 P.2d 296 (1999, 
Utah Lexis 20); Babilis, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 951 P.2d 207 (1997, 
Utah Lexis 108); and Ince, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 957 P.2d 1233 
(1998, Utah Lexis 17), matters, wherein trial courts recommended 
sanctions less than disbarment and the Supreme Court held that 
disbarment was appropriate. Weighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga 
against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a 
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as 
to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the 
time elapsed between misconduct and sanction. 
V I ?> 
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Mr. Ennenga makes an ex post fact 3 argument analogizing to 
crimina ] puni shment. The Court finds that I s contrary to case law 
and not persuasive These cases involved prolonged activi t i e s ant I 
repeated instances of serious misconduct. 
Mi finnenqa shou ! mi be suspended from the practice of law fs*> 
a period of six months, and when he :i s readmitted to practice 
a period not less than three years, he should have the supervision 
:: £ i n i exper :1 ence< I attorney -nd he should also participate -
psychological or psychiatri c counseling prior to practic 
again. 
D a t e d t h : " l i . i y «f»f A p i i 1 , ' M i n n . . . . . . ..• .... 
S^Mtrf 
STEPHEN L. H E N R I O D V ^ ^ ^ $ 
DISTRICT COURT JUD<3E, * ^-^f / 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this 7 day of 
April, 2000: 
Kate A. Toomey 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent 
5790 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Kate A. Toomey, #6446 
Assistant Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 I I I 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND 
) 
In the Matter of the ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Discipline of: ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) 
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999 ) Civil No. 970905496 
) 
Respondent. ) Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter was trie January 11, 2000, after which the Court took the matter 
under advisement. Prior ^ trial, Summary Judgment had been entered against 
respondent on Counts 8 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint, concluding that 
respondent had violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On January 
18, 2000, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, concluding that 
the respondent violated RIIIP 1 15 Safekeeping Property, H 4(b), Committiruj a Criminal 
Act that Reflects Adversely on the Lawyer's Honesty; 8.4(c), Engaging in Conduct 
liivulvinq I ir,linntu;lv I MIHI, I V U M I in MiMepresentrUmn, 1 4, I iilnn] In i ominiiiiu al 
with Client; and 8.1, additional conclusions of respondent's Failure to Provide 
Information to the Office of Professional Conduct. Following the Findings and 
Conclusions and after a waiver with respect to the time for a sanctions hearing, a 
3i 
hearing was held on March 28, 2000 regarding the issue of sanctions. The Court took 
the matter under advisement and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, generally 
the following factors should be considered: 
a. The duty violated; 
b. The lawyer's mental state; 
. c. The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
d. The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
The specific duties violated by Mr. Ennenga with respect to 8.1 were in three 
separate instances he failed to provide information to the OPC through the normal 
discovery process in this case. The duty that he violated with respect to Rule 1.4 was in 
failing to communicate with a client named Yarbil. After taking a partial retainer of $750 
and filing a Complaint, Mr. Ennenga failed to continue to work on the matter and failed 
to inform Mr. Yarbil of that fact. With respect to Rules 1.15, 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), Mr. 
Ennenga collected the sum of $18,000 for his client, Ms. Wilson, in May of 1992. Ms. 
Wilson requested that Mr. Ennenga hold it in his interest-bearing trust account because 
she was going through several important changes in her life and felt that the money 
would be better kept by her attorney. Mr. Ennenga never deposited the money into a 
trust account, but instead deposited part in his personal checking account and had part 
converted into a cashier's check, all of which he took and used for himself. At least part 
2 7rn 
of the m,one\ was, used to prev«?n1 l""1 Ii i: nnenqa's family home from being foreclosed for 
failure to make mortgage payments. 
The leason thai Mi i- nnciKjii misapfiiofjnatedl Ms Wilson's iiioirit >\ was, lh.it In1 
had a history of poor t)usiness practices in connection with his law practice which 
resulted in his personal financial situation being such that he c^n 
mortgage payments when due. This objective financial situation was coupled with Mr. 
Ennenga's subjective inability to inform his wife and children that he was not meeting 
hr t>nann;tf nhlirjnlinru M> Fnnenga ki lew that Ms. Wilson was not going to require 
immediate payment of her funds to her, and he stalled her when she started requesting 
would remit them to her. Mr. Ennenga testified that he didn't want to lie to Ms. Wilson, 
b» it he didn't want to admit that he had taken llho lands and no lonijei Iliad them eithei 
He further testified that he had many thousands of dollars outstanding in the form of 
accounts receivable and from the time that he took the $18,000 he believed he would 
be able to replace it with interest and pay Ms. Wilson Iler funds when she required 
them. Of course, this was not the case and he only repaid her in 1997 after her informal 
i omplamt aijaiiiist him was filed in H9(:i and rJn had also retained .in attorney to take 
action against Mr. Ennenga for the money. 
Mi i iirhil did no! testify and no ewdenne was pnnsenled I show that he sutteren 
an injury as a result of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct. Mr. Ennenga paid Ms. Wilson the 
sum of $30,000 in 1997 covering her principal, plus interest and attorney's fees, and 
when she testified, she did not claim any further injury. 
Rule 4 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that absent 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set forth above 
from Rule 3, that sanctions are generally appropriate as follows: when a lawyer 
engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e) or (f), disbarment 
is the presumptive sanction. Mr. Ennenga's misappropriation of Ms. Wilson's funds 
clearly falls into Rule 8.4(a). He acted with the intent to benefit himself. Said conduct 
also falls within Rule 4.2(b), because the misappropriation of funds was serious criminal 
conduct and involved misrepresentation to Ms. Wilson and misappropriation of her 
funds. The other violations fall either under Rule 4.3 or 4.4. Mr. Ennenga knowingly 
engaged in the misconduct and caused potential injury to the legal system, and 
interfered with the pending disciplinary action against him. 
Unbeknownst to the OPC, Mr. Ennenga had received two prior reprimands which 
he acknowledged at trial. Said reprimands were for failure to do timely filings in the late 
1980's that did not involve money. 
The presumptive sanction under Rule 4.2 for respondent's misappropriation of 
Ms. Wilson's money is disbarment. 
The next step in the analysis of the appropriate sanction is consideration of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6. In In re: Babilis, 951 P.2d 
215, the Supreme Court explained that, "To justify departure from the presumptive level 
4 a i Q 
of discipline set forth in the standards the aggravating and mitigating factors must be 
significant." 
Rule 6.2 provides that aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a) Prior record of discipline. There was prior discipline, but not of the same 
nature as the Wilson misconduct. 
(b) Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennenga's act was to benefit himself and 
his family. 
(c) A pattern of misconduct. The Court does not find a pattern of misconduct in 
this matter, excepting his reluctance to participate in the disciplinary process against 
him. 
(d) Multiple offenses. While consideration of the rules violated would seem to 
indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial court's perspective that there were minor 
offenses and one stand-alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter. 
(e) Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply 
with the rules or orders of the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga admits this. 
(f) Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process. This has apparently not occurred. 
(g) Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, 
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga has admitted the 
wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and 
5 r\ f /H 
expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took place. 
He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until shortly before the trial. 
(h) Vulnerability of victim. Neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. Wilson were particularly 
vulnerable. Ms. Wilson, in fact, made the misconduct too easy. 
(i) Substantial experience in the practice of law. Mr. Ennenga has practiced 
law for some 30 years, but it was only 21 years to the date of the misappropriation of 
funds. 
0) Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences 
of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga has made full restitution, but did not do so 
until he was under duress. 
(k) Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. The only 
illegal conduct that occurred here was the misappropriation of funds. 
The mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6.3 are as follows: 
(a) Absence of a prior record of discipline. As stated, above, there is a prior 
record of discipline, but less significant that 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct. 
(b) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Not the case here. 
(c) Personal or emotional problems. Mr. Ennenga was suffering personal and 
emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet his regular financial obligations. 
(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences 
of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly timely, but he did 
completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson. 
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(e) Full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct, or cooperative attitude toward proceedings. This did not 
occur. 
(f) Inexperience in the practice of the law. Not applicable. 
(g) Good character or reputation. Two attorneys in good standing and two 
clients of Mr. Ennenga's testified that they believed despite the facts of the instant case, 
that Mr. Ennenga was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty. 
(h) Physical disability. Not applicable. 
(i) Mental disability or impairment. Not applicable. 
(j) Unreasonable delay in the disciplinary proceedings provided that the 
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the 
respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay. There was a 
significant delay in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file her complaint against the 
respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect to other matters referred to above 
were filed in 1993. The OPC has been conducting an investigation into this matter 
since 1993, and only filed its Complaint in August of 1997, and its First Amended 
Complaint in September of 1997. Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't facilitate moving the 
case forward on a faster track in his refusal to "provide information to the Bar through the 
discovery process, but the delay is attributable as much or more to the OPC as it is to 
Mr. Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay. 
7 2 
(k) Interim reform. Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid complaints filed 
against him regarding misconduct after 1992. 
(I) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is aware of no other 
penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered. 
(m) Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful and has been 
since the 1992 misconduct. 
(n) Remoteness of prior offenses. Prior offenses are not particularly 
significant, but are also not particularly remote in time. 
The mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. In 
considering appropriate sanctions, the Court has reviewed the Tanner, 346 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 20, 960 P.2d 399 (1998, Utah Lexis 40); Stubbs. 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 974 P.2d 
296 (1999, Utah Lexis 20); Babilis, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 951 P.2d 207 (1997, Utah 
Lexis 108); and Ince, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 957 P.2d 1233 (1998, Utah Lexis 17), 
matters, wherein trial courts recommended sanctions less than disbarment and the 
Supreme Court held that disbarment was appropriate. Weighing the misconduct of Mr. 
Ennenga against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a 
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of 
incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and 
sanction. 
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Mr. Ennenga makes an ex post facto argument analogizing to criminal 
punishment. The Court finds that is contrary to case law and not persuasive. These 
cases involved prolonged activities and repeated instances of serious misconduct. 
Mr. Ennenga should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six 
months, and when he is readmitted to practice for a period not less than three years, he 
should have the supervision of an experienced attorney, and he should also participate 
in psychological or psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again. 
DATED this [_ day of April,'2000. 
BY THE COURT: ^ = = - ^ 
/ffijo OF/, 
The Honorable Stephen ^ ^ m : i o c t 
District Court Judge \ ^••... ° ^ . -
AS TO FORM: 
Brian R. Florence 
iv 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April ^£, 2000, I caused to be mailed via United States 
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent 
5790 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
z:\ennenga peter\formal\plead\findings of fact.doc 
M\uXb tijdlsms 
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l:-
Kate A. Toomey, #6446 
Assistant Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999 
Respondent. 
i ORDER: SUSPENSION 
I Civil No. 970905496 
I Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The Court, having reviewed all pleadings and papers filed in this matter, having 
conducted a sanctions hearing on March 28, 2000 for the purpose of receiving 
testimony and exhibits, having heard the argument of counsel, having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and otherwise being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Peter M. Ennenga, is suspended 
rom the practice of law for a period of six months. 
It is further ordered that when Mr. Ennenga is readmitted to practice, for a period 
not less than three years he shall have the supervision of an experienced attorney. 
It is further ordered that Mr. Ennenga shall participate in psychological or 
psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again. 
DATED this / _ day of 4pril/2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Stephen L. Henaqd, ^ - ^ 
District Court Judge W * . , * — -
-ir-
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brian R. Florence 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
S' IMT 'PJ C 0 U R T ' S A L T ^ ^ C0UNTY. STATE 
DATE: . o -H ' ya "£D 
J3Z 
* m 
<2d£LL 
DEPUTY COURT C L E F ^ ^ v J ^ ^ f e O ^ 
X>—.-'of 
2 S\ « i A 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April 2&> 2000, I caused to be mailed via United States 
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER: 
SUSPENSION to: 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent 
5790 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
J^jiub \UUmy 
z:\ennenga peter\formal\plead\order.doc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on May [^""2000, I caused to be mailed via United States 
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER: 
SUSPENSION to: 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent 
5790 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
z:\ennenga peter\formal\plead\order.doc 
3 
a « ^ \ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this iSS-rW of October, 2000, I caused to be mailed via 
United States mail, first class postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Brian R. Florence, 5790 Harrison Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah 84403. 
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